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vMany low-income parents with personal challenges that make work difficult (sometimes called the “hard
to employ”) seek help from the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, but many
do not. The most effective TANF programs offer cash assistance along with services that alleviate barri-
ers and help clients find jobs. Other federal-state programs offer help by providing either generic employ-
ment services or specialized services that address particular challenges. Hard-to-employ parents probably
fare best when they enroll in TANF and receive a holistic set of supports. A redesigned system should
marshal all program resources to provide an integrated system that addresses barriers and supports work
simultaneously.
ABSTRACT

Historically, antipoverty efforts in the United States sought to improve the well-being of children and
their families by providing cash assistance (or “welfare”), primarily through the Aid to Dependent Fam-
ilies with Children (AFDC) program. The 1990s saw a major transformation in this focus toward new
goals of limiting dependency and promoting work. A major part of this change was the replacement of
AFDC with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program in 1996, with its require-
ments and incentives for work and time limitations on benefit receipt. 
Many families that turned to AFDC and now turn to TANF for assistance have personal challenges that
make employment difficult without specialized services to address those challenges. TANF’s work focus
and the needs of many TANF families have expanded the discussion of the safety net for hard-to-employ
parents to include other federal and state programs that have traditionally addressed physical and mental
health problems and skill challenges, including the workforce development system, vocational rehabil-
itation, mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence services.1 The discussion also includes
the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program, which provides cash assistance payments to those
with severe disabilities.
This array of support programs especially comes into focus with the recent reauthorization of the TANF
program. New federal rules, passed as part of the Deficit Reduction Act (DRA) of 2005, require states
to increase the shares of their TANF caseloads participating in work activities and limit the amount of
barrier-removal activity that can count as work activity. States must meet a 50 percent work participa-
tion rate that applies to nearly all adults on TANF, including those often referred to as “hard to employ.”
This group generally includes parents with poor mental or physical health, substance abuse issues, learn-
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ing disabilities, language barriers, limited work skills, other substantial barriers to work, and combina-
tions of these barriers. 
States will need to marshal all program resources to address barriers to employment and move a greater
share of hard-to-employ parents into work activities. The reauthorization of TANF presents a timely
opportunity to review how the entire set of safety-net services works for hard-to-employ parents. This
review addresses four key questions: 
n Who are the hard to employ, and how many need specialized services?
n How do states’ choices about the structure of their TANF programs affect hard-to-employ parents on
welfare? 
n What other service programs potentially address the needs of hard-to-employ parents? And how much
do other federal cash assistance programs for people with disabilities fill the gap? Does TANF serve
as an effective gateway to other services and disability benefits?
n Now that fewer low-income families enroll in TANF than under the prior welfare system, do we need
to think harder about ways to connect families to a broader set of nonwelfare support services? 
This paper begins by describing the general caseload size and characteristics of hard-to-employ parents
with welfare experience and those that remain outside this cash assistance program. The distinction
between hard-to-employ parents with and without a recent welfare connection is important because fam-
ilies outside TANF often do not receive services that address barriers to employment. Next, the paper
describes how states’ TANF programs approach the needs of hard-to-employ parents. While it is impos-
sible to fully understand or describe the nuances of 50 different state programs, national program data
and surveys of states’ approaches help generally describe some key variations in program characteristics.
The paper then describes other safety-net service programs that support adults with employment chal-
lenges and how these programs typically coordinate with TANF in varied ways. It concludes with impli-
cations for thinking about how the safety net for hard-to-employ parents could be improved.
Who Are Hard-to-Employ Parents? 
Numerous studies have focused on parents’ characteristics associated with labor market difficulties in
the context of welfare reform, and a few have examined hard-to-employ parents that do not enroll in
welfare. Human capital liabilities (low education levels and limited work experience) and personal lia-
bilities (poor physical and mental health) are associated with lower employment rates. Other individual
and family characteristics that often act as barriers to employment include language barriers, chemical
dependence, learning disabilities, a criminal record, experiencing domestic violence, having an infant or
a child with a significant disability, lack of transportation or child care to support work, and unstable
housing. Many studies find the presence of multiple barriers most significantly predicts low employment
levels.
The distinction between hard-to-employ parents with and without a recent welfare connection is impor-
tant because families outside TANF do not receive TANF services that address barriers to employment.
Researchers do not fully understand why some hard-to-employ, poor families do not participate in wel-
fare. New TANF rules may discourage them from applying for TANF, making it so difficult that they
drop out during the application process. Work participation requirements also can make it difficult to
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sustain participation once families gain eligibility. Increased stigma associated with welfare may also
discourage families from participating.
Numerous studies point to reasons families do not seek help from government programs. Zedlewski and
colleagues (2006) summarize this literature and show that many individuals lack knowledge about
program eligibility or misunderstand the rules, others perceive that the benefits do not outweigh the cost
of participation, and some families choose not to seek government help as a matter of pride or a desire
to avoid the stigma of participation. In general, programs with complex rules that require detailed
documentation of family circumstances and requirements for participation discourage participation.2
We do know that a smaller share of families potentially eligible for benefits actually participates than did
before 1996. Recent estimates show that less than 50 percent of families eligible for TANF assistance
actually participated in the program in 2004, considerably lower than the 85 percent pre–welfare reform
participation rate in 1995 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [HHS] 2006). 
The low TANF participation rate means that many low-income parents with barriers to employment
must either find appropriate services on their own or cope without any help. Parents without help face
a greater danger of economic instability for their children and less hope for addressing their mental and
physical health issues and eventually finding work. The discussion below describes the characteristics of
families that do seek help through the TANF program and those without a recent welfare history.
Families on TANF
A recent set of surveys in five states and the District of Columbia, sponsored by HHS, measured the
prevalence of barriers among welfare recipients.3 The synthesis of the findings shows that welfare recip-
ients commonly have significant human capital and personal liabilities (Hauan and Douglas 2004). For
example, 40 percent of the recipients in these six sites had not completed high school or a GED (figure 1).
About one in five had low work experience (defined as working less than half their adult years), and
about one in five failed to perform at least 4 out of 10 common job tasks. Three in 10 welfare recipients
reported mental health problems, and 2 in 10 reported physical health problems (figure 2). While human
capital deficits showed little variation across the sites, the share of recipients with health problems did
vary. Four out of 10 recipients in Colorado, for example, reported having mental health problems, com-
pared with 2 out of 10 recipients in the District of Columbia and Maryland.
These surveys also showed the prevalence of many other barriers to employment among welfare recipi-
ents. Relatively small numbers (fewer than 1 in 10) have chemical dependence, obvious learning
disabilities, severe domestic violence experience, or criminal records. However, nearly one in three fam-
ilies reported having a special-needs child. Over half reported neighborhood problems such as unem-
ployment, drugs, crime, or rundown buildings and yards, and a fifth reported that they experienced
unstable housing. Human capital deficits and health problems all were significantly and negatively asso-
ciated with employment. Unstable housing also presented a significant barrier to employment.
Other studies confirm the high levels of barriers to employment among TANF recipients using national
samples. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2001), for example, finds that 44 percent
of TANF recipients have physical or mental impairments, a proportion almost three times as high as among
adults in the no-TANF population. Acs and Loprest (2007) report that recent data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (representing 2003) and the Current Population Survey (2005) con-
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tinue to indicate that 40 percent of recipients have less than a high school degree and about 25 percent
report a health condition that limits work. 
Families Outside TANF
One group of hard-to-employ families outside TANF that has received recent attention is those not con-
nected to work, welfare, or cash disability benefit programs. These families, often called “disconnected,”
have the most severe barriers to employment. Loprest and Zedlewski (2006) provide the only data that
compare low-income families with and without a recent connection to welfare and show the subsets of
both groups that are disconnected. Their data show the prevalence of barriers in 2002 for a nationally
representative sample of low-income families, generally defined as families with incomes below 200 per-
cent of the federal poverty level (table 1). Their results for current welfare recipients show similar levels
of barrier prevalence to the studies discussed above. The authors’ study shows that over 8 in 10 discon-
nected families have had no recent connection with welfare. 
Loprest and Zedlewski (2006) document that disconnected families, especially those that recently left
welfare, have the highest incidence of employment barriers.4 A large share of disconnected families have
limited work experience (52 percent for those never on welfare and 42 percent of the disconnected that
recently left welfare), higher than the rates for current welfare recipients (29 percent) and much higher
than for connected, recent welfare leavers (4 percent). Disconnected families recently connected to wel-
fare have somewhat higher levels of other employment barriers relative to disconnected families with no
welfare experience, perhaps indicating that those with the most severe needs more often turn to the
TANF program for help. The authors’ study also shows that barriers to employment among the discon-
nected and families on welfare substantially exceed rates for the general low-income population. 
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FIGURE 1.  Prevalence of Human Capital Liabilities among TANF Recipients in 2001–02 (percent)
Source: Hauan and Douglas (2004).
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The incidence of multiple barriers to employment perhaps best summarizes the differences across these
family groups. Disconnected families have the highest incidence of multiple barriers to employment—
69 percent of those with recent welfare experience and 56 percent of those with no welfare history—
higher than rates for current welfare recipients. Connected families with no welfare history and those
with recent welfare history have the lowest incidence of multiple employment barriers. Still, about one
in three of these low-income families report multiple employment barriers.
TANF and Hard-to-Employ Parents
Many parents with the most severe employment barriers and low incomes turn to TANF for help. All
TANF programs offer some cash assistance to parents who meet income, asset, and immigrant eligibil-
ity tests. Documented TANF rules, however, indicate the tremendous variation in TANF programs
across the country. Thus, it can be instructive to review some broad categories of rules that affect hard-
to-employ parents who enroll in TANF.
The TANF policies particularly salient to the hardest to employ parents include screening and assess-
ment for barriers, exemptions from work requirements, sanctions for those not complying with require-
ments, and time limits. While it is impossible to fully understand how these policies play out on the
ground, this paper draws upon secondary information from a few sources to draw a rough picture 
of how the process works. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (2001) completed a survey of 
600 county welfare offices to understand their approaches to those designated as hard to employ because
of a physical or mental health problem. The Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database tracks state welfare
HARD-TO-EMPLOY PARENTS 5
FIGURE 2.  Prevalence of Personal Liabilities among TANF Recipients in 2001–02 (percent)
Source: Hauan and Douglas (2004).
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policies using information abstracted from caseworker handbooks and subsequent reviews by state
agencies.5 States’ TANF administrative data reports to the federal government provide a few measures
that indicate the share of hard-to-employ adults on TANF. Finally, a recent survey by Loprest and
colleagues (forthcoming) of 17 states and three local welfare offices provides some updated information
about states’ current policies toward the hard to employ and how policies might change in the future as
a result of welfare reauthorization. 
Assessment for Barriers to Employment
Parents applying for welfare generally are asked whether they have conditions that prevent employment,
but states vary in how they gather this information. The GAO (2001) finds that most TANF agencies
say that they screen applicants for physical and mental health impairments, and many screen for learn-
ing disabilities. Yet, over three-quarters of TANF agencies use “self-disclosure” to identify conditions or
impairments that would preclude work. Individuals usually must provide medical verification once a
barrier has been disclosed. To a lesser extent, welfare offices use structured screening tools to identify
barriers, and these tools vary considerably in content and intensity. In 2001, only 12 percent of the offices
in the GAO survey relied on a more formal, standardized screening tools, and the remaining 11 percent
of county offices relied on caseworkers’ observations to identify verbal or behavioral cues that indicate
impairments. 
Many TANF offices prefer, at least initially, to use a “labor market screen” (that is, requiring participants
to engage in job search) to avoid costly assessments that may not effectively identify who can find work.
The lack of up-front assessment and the difficulty of identifying some types of barriers mean that some
parents with significant impairments must comply with TANF work requirements before receiving any
services that address their specific employment challenges. Initial screeners often do not uncover all
impairments, especially hidden disabilities that may be unknown to recipients but still interfere with
work. Also, recipients are sometimes reluctant to identify impairments because they fear it could lead to
negative repercussions. 
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TABLE 1.  Barriers to Work among Low-Income Families with Children by Recent Connection to TANF, 2002
Never on Welfare Recently on Welfare
Currently 
Barrier on welfare Disconnected Other Disconnected Other
No work in 2+ years 28.5 52.2 21.9 41.6 4.2
Less than high school education/no GED 41.4 33.9 24.7 59.4 26.7
Spanish speaking 10.9 22.6 21.6 5.4 4.6
Health limits work 25.2 21.8 8.1 29.4 15.9
Poor mental health 24.4 24.1 10.2 34.0 26.9
Age of youngest child <1 18.3 17.5 12.0 14.6 14.4
Child in family receives SSI 7.6 8.5 2.9 6.0 5.0
No car, not in metropolitan area 4.9 8.6 3.3 16.3 8.5
Multiple barriers 50.4 55.7 31.0 68.8 29.3
Sources: 2002 National Survey of America’s Families; numbers calculated from Loprest and Zedlewski (2006), tables 10, 11, and 20.
Notes: Sample defined as current or last year’s income below 200 percent of the federal poverty level and income not above 250 percent of the
poverty level in either year, to provide comparable sample for no welfare families. Disconnected defined as no earnings in past year by either parent,
no TANF, and no government disability benefits received by the parents.
While most offices rely on self-disclosure of impairments at the time of application for TANF benefits,
a more formal assessment may occur later for enrollees who show difficulty finding employment or com-
plying with other TANF rules. Three-quarters of TANF agencies report that they eventually assess
enrollees with participation difficulties for physical or mental health impairment or learning disabilities.
Although most of these assessments are conducted by caseworkers, the GAO survey indicates that 
32 percent of local offices use medical professionals, 10 percent use state vocational and rehabilitation
specialists, and 4 percent use certified social workers.
Loprest and colleagues (forthcoming) identify some of the challenges states face in assessing TANF appli-
cants for barriers to employment. Michigan, for example, reported that about half of adults that left
TANF under its strong work-first policy returned within 12 months. In 2007, Michigan began imple-
menting a new statewide program with up-front assessment and intensive services to address barriers.
Washington, a state that has relied heavily on screening and assessment tools in the past, recently imple-
mented a new comprehensive assessment program that requires all TANF applicants to be assessed by
multiple service agencies (including the community college system, economic development, employ-
ment services, and the Department of Social and Health Services). An early evaluation of the New York
City WeCare program that includes comprehensive assessments, on the other hand, shows that hard-to-
employ parents can find it difficult to complete processes requiring multiple assessment appointments
(Kasdan with Youdelman 2007).
Exemptions from Work Requirements
Hard-to-employ parents with identified barriers may or may not be exempt from TANF work require-
ments or participation in barrier removal services. States’ TANF program rules indicate that most states
exempt some TANF recipients with illness or disability from work requirements. However, 15 states
allowed no such exemptions in 2005 (table 2).6 The GAO (2001) finds that about 63 percent of local
offices exempt TANF recipients with impairments from work requirements.7 Some states that exempt
TANF recipients with illness or disability assign them to a separate state program (SSP) to exclude these
individuals from the federal work participation calculation and usually work participation. At least
through fiscal year 2006, SSPs were funded with state dollars that count toward their maintenance-of-
effort (MOE) requirements.8
In 2005, states classified about 10 percent of their adult TANF caseload as exempt because of illness or
disability, and less than 3 percent of the adult caseload was in a SSP because of disability (table 3). States’
exemption rates vary considerably around these averages. Eight states (Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Montana,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wisconsin) report that they either do not allow exemptions from work
requirements for illness or only allow exemptions for “good cause” reasons and classify 1 percent or less
of their caseloads as disabled.9 In contrast, eight states (Delaware, Michigan, New Hampshire, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia) classify about 20 percent or more of their regular
TANF caseloads as disabled. Five additional states (Connecticut, Maryland, Nebraska, South Carolina,
and Virginia) have relatively large SSPs for adults with disabilities. Given the similarities in prevalence
of barriers among welfare recipients across individual states discussed earlier, it is likely that these out-
come differences reflect states’ TANF policies. 
An exemption from work requirements may or may not mean that these adults receive services to address
their barriers to employment. Some states encourage those with substantial health impairments to apply
for federal disability benefits, and some local offices help these clients through this lengthy application
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TABLE 2.  State Policies Affecting the Hard to Serve, 2005
Ill or Incapacitated:a Full Sanction:
Exempt from First time limit
State work requirements SSP First: Last: (months)
Alabama X O X 60
Alaska X X 60
Arizona X 60
Arkansas X X 24
California X 60b
Colorado Xc X 60
Connecticut X X X 21
Delaware X O X 36
Dist. of Col. X X —
Florida O X X 48
Georgia Xc X X 48
Hawaii X O X X 60
Idaho X X 24
Illinois O X 60
Indiana X X X 24b
Iowa O X X 60
Kansas X X 60
Kentucky Xc X 60
Louisiana X X 24 of 60
Maine Xd X —
Maryland X X X X 60
Massachusetts X O X 24 of 60
Michigan X X X —
Minnesota Xd X X 60
Mississippi X X X 60
Missouri X X 60
Montana X 60
Nebraska X X X X 24 of 48
Nevada X X X X 24
New Hampshire X O 60
New Jersey X X X 60
New Mexico X X 60
New York X X —
North Carolina X X 24
North Dakota Xc X 60
Ohio X X 36
Oklahoma X X 60
Oregon X 24 of 84
Pennsylvania X X 60
Rhode Island X X X 60b
South Carolina X X X X 24 of 120
South Dakota X X 60
Tennessee X O X X 18
Texas X X X 12, 24, or 36e
Utah O X 36
Vermont X O —
Virginia X X X X 24
process. Exempt individuals may receive mental health services, medical services to address physical
health issues, or education to address learning disabilities. TANF adults may be referred to local service
providers or receive more intensive case management that connects them with providers. Some states
and local welfare offices also offer but do not mandate work participation services for parents exempt
because of illness or another serious barrier to employment. Procedures vary tremendously across states
and local welfare offices. The GAO (2001) reports that 43 percent of counties offer some services to
recipients with health impairments to move them toward employment. We do not know, however, what
share of parents with particular barriers actually receives services. 
Sanctions 
Sanctions that reduce or eliminate benefits for failure to comply with work participation activities can
present a greater risk for hard-to-employ parents than for other recipients. States use sanctions to moti-
vate clients to participate in program activities and hold them accountable for their actions. Recipients
with undisclosed mental health problems, substance abuse, learning disabilities, or unreported domes-
tic violence may find it difficult to conduct the required job search activities, show up for appointments
on time, or even participate in such barrier-removal activities as mental health counseling. The risk
increases in states that impose full-family sanctions after the first incidence of noncompliance. While
states may try to avoid applying sanctions to those with serious impairments, lack of accurate identifi-
cation of barriers can lead to sanctions for hard-to-employ parents, particularly in states that require
participation of everyone or have very narrow exemption criteria.
State sanction policies vary, with 19 states using full-family sanctions (loss of the entire benefit) for the
first failure to comply with requirements (see table 2). Most other states use partial sanctions that elim-
inate only the adult portion of the benefit for the first compliance failure and then apply a full-family
sanction after more than one compliance failure. Only seven states (California, Maine, Missouri, New
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TABLE 2.  (continued)
Ill or Incapacitated:a Full Sanction:
Exempt from First time limit
State work requirements SSP First: Last: (months)
Source: Welfare Rules Database and comments from selected states.
O = states that have a separate state program but report less than 1% of the caseload as exempt due to disability. 
a. These data do not indicate the variation in how states define illness or disability.
b. The time limit applies only to the adult in the unit; children continue to receive benefits.
c. The state does not consider these groups technically exempt, but they may meet the state’s criteria for good cause for noncompliance or deferral.
d. Caseworker manuals and Welfare Rules Database report no exemptions from work requirements, but state reports a significant share in exempt
due to disability, as shown in table 3.
e. Time limits vary by recipient’s education and work experience.
Washington X O X —
West Virginia X O X 60
Wisconsin O 60
Wyoming X X X 60
Total number of states 36 16 19 43
10 HARD-TO-EMPLOY PARENTS
TABLE 3.  Share of the Caseload in High-Risk Categories, 2005
TANF TANF/SSP
exempt: SSP exempt: Time limited cases in
Total disability disability and extendedb sanctionc Total percent
State caseloada (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) of caseload
Alabama 11,074 13.3 0.8 1.1 9.4 24.6
Alaska 3,301 10.5 3.5 2.9 17.0
Arizona 24,325 8.7 0.1 0.9 9.8
Arkansas 4,311 15.6 0.1 13.0 28.7
California 284,981 9.7 0.0 6.4 14.7 32.0
Colorado 10,282 16.5 0.7 1.0 18.2
Connecticut 15,915 1.3 17.6 0.4 1.8 21.2
Delaware 3,105 21.3 0.0 0.0 2.5 23.7
Dist. of Col. 13,828 3.3 2.6 21.2 23.2 50.3
Florida 22,502 1.5 0.0 1.1 13.9 16.5
Georgia 16,773 0.0 1.2 1.3 1.6 4.1
Hawaii 8,691 0.0 0.0 0.0 27.6 27.6
Idaho 516 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Illinois 20,293 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 2.1
Indiana 27,647 11.0 1.5 0.0 3.5 16.1
Iowa 16,747 0.5 0.1 1.3 4.8 6.7
Kansas 12,702 2.2 5.3 0.0 7.4
Kentucky 18,175 8.0 1.0 7.4 16.4
Louisiana 5,744 9.5 1.1 0.0 10.6
Maine 8,952 11.9 5.4 11.6 2.3 31.1
Maryland 16,370 3.7 12.3 11.6 1.1 28.7
Massachusetts 31,734 0.0 0.3 0.1 61.5 61.9
Michigan 53,048 30.5 17.4 0.0 47.9
Minnesota 23,186 5.6 1.2 10.3 4.9 22.0
Mississippi 8,651 7.8 0.6 0.8 9.2
Missouri 35,013 3.3 7.9 1.1 3.2 15.4
Montana 3,197 0.1 0.1 4.7 5.0
Nebraska 6,368 2.0 27.7 9.4 0.1 39.2
Nevada 4,222 0.8 3.2 0.2 0.0 4.2
New Hampshire 4,402 26.8 0.2 4.0 7.4 38.3
New Jersey 32,510 11.8 1.5 11.2 5.8 30.4
New Mexico 12,019 18.0 0.0 6.1 24.1
New York 131,895 11.0 6.2 4.9 11.4 33.5
North Carolina 14,637 14.3 0.2 2.3 16.8
North Dakota 2,221 4.3 0.2 3.3 7.8
Ohio 39,450 1.0 0.7 0.1 1.8
Oklahoma 5,392 1.1 1.9 0.0 3.0
Oregon 10,852 29.7 0.0 4.7 34.4
Pennsylvania 70,824 19.4 13.5 3.8 36.6
Rhode Island 10,425 11.8 1.9 16.4 3.7 33.8
South Carolina 10,369 4.0 25.6 0.0 2.2 31.7
South Dakota 1,006 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.3
Tennessee 53,389 4.3 0.1 0.0 15.9 20.2
Texas 41,434 20.7 0.0 0.0 0.3 24.4
Utah 6,019 0.2 0.0 1.8 2.8 4.8
Vermont 3,936 21.2 0.4 0.0 4.8 26.5
Virginia 36,682 0.5 21.4 0.0 0.0 21.9
Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia never impose full-family
sanctions. 
The treatment of noncompliance is far more complicated than implied by these simple sanction rules.
Individual caseworker discretion can play an important role in deciding whether and when to initiate a
sanction. Also, some states with full-family sanctions specifically exempt individuals in SSPs because of
physical or mental illness (such as South Carolina). Still other states have extensive due-process proce-
dures before applying sanctions.
Although researchers do not have readily available statistics on the number of cases closed because of
full-family sanctions, states do report the share of the adult caseload with partial sanctions.10 Most states
list fewer than 10 percent of families as sanctioned, with a few exceptions (table 3). The District of
Columbia, Hawaii, and Tennessee all report about one-quarter of their caseloads as sanctioned, and
Massachusetts reports 62 percent sanctioned. 
Some local welfare offices deal with the risk of sanctioning hard-to-employ parents through procedures
that try to reconcile or reconnect sanctioned parents. Once they reconnect with sanctioned parents, they
may assess the parent for special needs. The GAO (2001) reports that 60 percent of local TANF offices
make at least two attempts to contact sanctioned recipients, and 40 percent make one attempt. About
one-quarter of the offices making two contacts schedule in-person, follow-up meetings, and 15 percent
conduct in-home visits. Loprest and colleagues (forthcoming) discuss strategies to reconnect with sanc-
tioned adults in Maryland and Los Angeles County. Maryland has an intensive reconciliation process
using multiple methods to reach out to clients with sanctions, including home visits. Los Angeles
recently began an intensive outreach to sanctioned parents, including home visits, in response to the
large share of its caseload in sanction status. 
Despite efforts by some states to avoid sanctioning hard-to-employ individuals or have them come back
into compliance once sanctioned, a 2003 research review found sanctioned recipients are more likely
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TABLE 3.  (continued)
TANF TANF/SSP
exempt: SSP exempt: Time limited cases in
Total disability disability and extendedb sanctionc Total percent
State caseloada (percent) (percent) (percent) (percent) of caseload
Source: National TANF database as of April 6, 2005, with corrections for SSP exempt from California and Texas. 
a. The total caseload is calculated as the sum of all families on TANF and in separate state programs, minus families with no adult, plus families with a
parent in the household but not included in the unit that are in sanction status. Note that sanction data for child-only units are not available for Col-
orado, Hawaii, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, or Wyoming.
b. Percent of heads of household or spouses with over 60 months countable toward the federal time limit. 
c. This column includes child-only units in sanction and adult recipients in sanction/waiver status. Note that sanction data for child-only units are
not available for Maryland, Montana, Oklahoma, or Wyoming.
Washington 37,534 5.6 0.3 12.1 5.7 23.8
West Virginia 7,567 19.5 0.2 0.0 5.5 25.2
Wisconsin 9,532 0.9 0.1 4.3 13.6 18.9
Wyoming 69 0.1 8.7 0.0 13.6 22.4
U.S. total 1,267,379 9.6 2.8 5.3 9.2 26.8
than nonsanctioned recipients to have challenges that make them harder to employ and more likely to
return to TANF (Pavetti, Derr, and Hesketh 2003). Goldberg and Schott (2000) cite several studies
showing that health problems and disabilities are a major cause of noncompliance and TANF sanctions.
Also, Goldberg (2002) reports that certain states disproportionately sanction recipients with disabilities
or other barriers. Polit, London, and Martinez (2001) and Cherlin and others (2001) find that the like-
lihood of sanctions increases with the number of health barriers. 
Time Limits 
Time limits present another risk for parents that find it difficult to obtain employment. While federal
rules limit federal TANF assistance to a maximum of five years, 19 states have chosen shorter time lim-
its (table 2). At the other extreme, 8 states either have no time limit or some guarantee of indefinite
benefits for children.11 Shorter time limits pose greater risks for parents with impairments who gener-
ally need more time to move into jobs. Also, the GAO (2001) finds that 27 percent of local welfare offices
exempt some parents from work requirements but not time limits. These parents may face the greatest
challenge because the clock is ticking even though they typically are not engaged in work participation
activities.
Nearly all states allow for some time-limit exemptions or extensions.12 Federal rules allow states to exempt
20 percent of the adult caseload from the federal five-year time limit. Since child-only cases constitute
over 40 percent of the caseload, on average, and they are exempt from time limits, the effective exemp-
tion allows states, on average, to exempt one-third of parents from the time limit. States may apply this
exemption to those initially designated as disabled, and they may exempt individuals finding employ-
ment difficult on a case-by-case basis. 
States can use a liberal time-limit extension policy to mitigate the effects of tough work participation
policies for hard-to-employ families. In practice, however, states granted relatively few extensions to time
limits in 2005 (table 3). On average, only 5 percent of adults subject to time limits had their time lim-
its extended. Important exceptions include the District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Washington, all of which have granted extensions to over 
10 percent of their TANF caseloads. 
Implications of the Deficit Reduction Act 
States’ current policies and approaches toward hard-to-employ parents may change as a result of the
DRA. While the DRA maintains a 50 percent work participation requirement for adults on TANF, the
new law changes how states must calculate their work participation rates.13 DRA requires most adults
to be included in the rate calculation, including adults exempt owing to a disability, in SSPs, and in sanc-
tion status.14 DRA also limits the amount of barrier-removal activities that can count toward work par-
ticipation. Generally, clients can receive a maximum of six weeks of job-readiness assistance each year,
including such assistance as mental health counseling designed to address barriers.15 Adults can only
receive a lifetime total of 12 months of vocational educational training. Some additional job training,
such as completion of a GED program, can count as a noncore activity, limited to 10 out of 30 hours
per weekly work requirement. States have until the end of fiscal year 2007 to submit changes to their
current TANF plans, but the new participation rate requirements will be effective for fiscal year 2007.
States that on average have over a quarter of their caseloads in exempt, time-limit-extended, and sanc-
tion statuses generally will find it difficult to meet these new requirements (table 3). Some states have
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much larger shares of their caseloads in these categories than others. Also, these statistics do not reflect
all hard-to-employ parents, nor do they reflect the increase in the hard to employ that has occurred in
some areas. New York City, for example, reports that the share of its caseload considered “able-bodied”
declined from 63 percent in 1999 to 39 percent in 2006.16 While the 50 percent work participation
requirement still allows states to exempt hard-to-employ parents, it places much more pressure on states
to move more parents into paid jobs quickly. Success likely will vary depending on the strength of the
local labor market and the ability of local offices to quickly connect parents without significant impair-
ments to paid work opportunities. 
States may employ other strategies to meet the new requirements. The survey of states conducted by
Loprest and others (forthcoming) indicates that some states no longer will continue to exempt hard-to-
employ parents from work activities. More states will try to combine work requirements with barrier-
removal activities or stabilization activities. Respondents discussed the challenges associated with this
shift in strategy, because mental health counselors and educators traditionally focus on addressing
impairments and deficits rather than strategies that also support clients’ work activities. Also, many
TANF programs do not have staff trained to combine these services. Some states noted they would focus
more on clients’ SSI applications, to ensure that those with substantial health impairments enroll in fed-
eral disability benefits and leave the TANF caseload more quickly. Some states mentioned the need to
add resources to services for the hard to employ, especially mental health counseling, to help them learn
how to better manage impairments as they move into the labor market. 
Beyond TANF: Other Services for Hard-to-Employ Adults
Hard-to-employ parents can benefit from an array of employment services to help them prepare for, find,
and retain employment. Parents may access these services directly or be directed to these services through
their TANF participation. These services include the public workforce development system authorized
by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998 and the vocational rehabilitation (VR) program for
employment-related services. Parents may also need mental health, substance abuse, and domestic vio-
lence services for assistance with addressing specific barriers. While these services do not focus directly
on employment, they can provide a way to stabilize barriers and enable an adult to work. 
Each program and service system has its own mission, population focus, and challenges. While these sys-
tems provide services that can benefit low-income hard-to-employ parents, this group is not the sole (or
even main) clientele for their services. This means there may be special challenges in using these services
for hard-to-employ parents. Also, these programs traditionally have not focused on accessing income
supports for clients and their families while receiving services. With the exception of WIA programs in
some states, these service systems for the most part have not had close links with TANF programs. TANF
program requirements regarding work participation and time limits often conflict with the goals of these
other service programs and may not be understood by service providers. Also, the organization of these
services typically occurs locally, and it varies tremendously within states as well as across the nation. This
section provides an overview of the common elements in these systems across communities and discusses
how they generally interface with TANF.
Workforce Development System 
The public workforce development system, authorized by WIA in 1998, aims to provide a seamless, one-
stop service delivery system of employment assistance for all job seekers, regardless of income, and to all
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employers. WIA serves a broad group including youth, the general adult population, and dislocated
workers. Originally authorized through 2003, WIA operates under a continuing resolution while con-
gressional debate over the specific parameters of a reauthorized program remains unresolved. 
There are currently more than 3,000 one-stop centers across the country.17 WIA was developed in
response to concerns over the duplication and inefficiencies associated with the fragmented patchwork
of employment and training programs that had marked the nation’s workforce development system.
WIA’s guiding principles include streamlined services to simplify and expand access, individual empow-
erment, universal access to core employment-related services (e.g., self-directed and assisted job search
services, labor market information), increased accountability through performance measures, engaging
the private sector, and enhanced state and local flexibility. 
In addition to core employment services, WIA provides other services (called “intensive” services) and
training to those unable to obtain employment through core services. These additional services include
comprehensive and specialized assessments, development of an individual employment plan, case man-
agement, and training for those who have been unsuccessful in their job search and would benefit from
training. In keeping with the priority WIA places on state and local flexibility, there is no standardized
eligibility process for accessing these additional services and training, and this leads to considerable
variability in who receives them across areas. 
More than a dozen “mandatory partner” programs must participate in and share in the costs of the WIA
workforce development system. With the exception of VR services, the mandatory partners are not solely
focused on the hard to employ. TANF is not a mandatory partner, but about half of all states have cho-
sen to make TANF or the TANF work program a mandatory partner. 
In fiscal year 2005, WIA federal appropriations included about $1 billion for youth activities and about
$900 million each for adults and dislocated workers.18 Funds flow through the U.S. Department of
Labor, and states need not match the federal funds. Mandatory service partners contribute to WIA’s
funds. Partners usually provide in-kind staff resources and sometimes help for infrastructure costs. Part-
ner organizations often face their own funding constraints, and the requirement that partners should
pay for the costs of the one-stop infrastructure generally has been an ongoing source of tension. 
WIA gives public assistance recipients and other low-income individuals priority for intensive and train-
ing services, but they are not the sole recipients of these services. For example, in 2003, about 68 per-
cent of adults that used WIA funding to pay for training were low income, and just 14 percent were
public assistance recipients. In addition, the resources available to the public workforce development
system under WIA fall short of needs (Osterman 2007). Funds available for training particularly are
limited. The GAO (2005) estimates that 235,000 poor adults received training under local workforce
programs in 2003, and this number has fallen over time. 
Despite WIA’s stated priority on serving low-income and public assistance recipients, several factors work
against hard-to-employ parents gaining access to noncore services and training. WIA programs must
meet performance standards that focus on unsubsidized employment and retention or face significant
financial penalties. The performance measures do not adjust to reflect any additional costs or difficul-
ties associated with serving clients with multiple barriers. Consequently, there is a significant disincen-
tive to provide WIA-funded services (noncore services and access to training) to the hard to employ,
especially those with significant disabilities (Bader 2003; Timmons, Fesko, and Hall 2003; GAO
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2002). Although WIA partners vary across localities, many WIA programs are not closely connected and
coordinated with barrier alleviation services in the community (such as mental health and substance
abuse) and do not fund these services themselves. Instead, despite the fact that hard-to-employ individ-
uals could in fact benefit from WIA intensive services and training, many may only receive basic core
services or get referred to partners (such as TANF and VR) for other services without further coordina-
tion or collaboration. In addition, an important focus of WIA programs is engaging and serving private-
sector employers, and this focus poses a tension with promoting work for those with employment
challenges. 
WIA and TANF interactions. Both TANF and WIA allow significant variation in the design and imple-
mentation of welfare and workforce systems, leading to considerable differences in how these two systems
intersect across the country. Many states maintain separate administrative structures but contract with
the workforce system for various employment services for TANF clients. In addition, at the local level,
a variety of mechanisms may be used to coordinate one-stop and TANF services such as co-location of
staff, outstationing WIA staff at the TANF agency, coordinated service planning, cross-training, and
leveraging funding so a client can be enrolled in WIA intensive services or training while receiving
supportive services through TANF (Werner and Lodewick 2004). 
A few states have integrated all or part of their TANF and workforce development programs. For example,
Utah and Wisconsin have consolidated all TANF welfare and workforce functions into a single agency.
Florida consolidated all WIA and TANF employment functions but retains a separate agency to adminis-
ter TANF eligibility and cash benefits. (Wisconsin also integrated VR in its consolidated workforce admin-
istrative structure, but this is uncommon.) Oregon, Minnesota, and Texas, among others, also have highly
integrated systems. Consolidated administrative structures foster, but do not guarantee, increased access to
services for both TANF and non-TANF individuals (Ranghelli, Patel, and Greenberg 2003). 
In other states, there is little to no local coordination between TANF and WIA, and the two generally
operate in separate program and funding silos. For example, in Virginia, a state with a strong work-first
focus and generally minimal collaboration between WIA and TANF, only 6 percent of TANF work
program participants tracked for a two-year period received intensive services through the one-stop
system, and only 4 percent participated in WIA funded skills training.19
TANF program rules and approaches to serving their hard-to-employ clients may also impede partici-
pation of TANF clients in WIA services. States with a strong work-first emphasis and few additional
supports for TANF clients with multiple barriers to employment usually do not provide the opportu-
nity to participate in WIA intensive or training services. Their programs focus on helping all TANF
clients find immediate employment rather than education or training, whether funded by WIA or other
sources (Werner and Lodewick 2004).
Vocational Rehabilitation Services
The Vocational Rehabilitation program, authorized under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, serves indi-
viduals with disabilities diagnosed by licensed health care professionals. The disability must be a barrier
to employment and require VR services to secure or regain employment. VR services include, but are
not limited to, an eligibility determination and needs assessment, vocational counseling, vocational train-
ing, personal assistance services, supported employment, transportation related to other VR services, and
job-placement services.
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The concepts of “informed choice” and “order of selection” shape VR program design and organizational
culture. VR seeks to place individuals in jobs commensurate with their strengths, resources, priorities,
concerns, and capabilities. Informed choice ensures that consumers can choose among available service
options and activities throughout the rehabilitation process. Order of selection requires that VR agen-
cies first serve individuals with the most significant disabilities when resources are more limited than
demand for services. 
In fiscal year 2006, the federal appropriation for VR state grants was $2.7 billion. Funds are distributed
to the states based on per capita income and population through the U.S. Department of Education.20
In fiscal year 2005, the VR program assisted about 1 million individuals. States claim that the program
can meet the needs of only a small percentage of eligible individuals. One estimate claims that only about
one in twenty who could benefit actually receives services. As a result of limited funds, many state VR
agencies implement the order-of-selection system, which offers VR services only to individuals with the
most significant disabilities. 
As a mandatory partner in the WIA one-stop system, VR often equips the one-stop centers with assis-
tive technology, provides accessibility assessments, and co-locates VR counselors to provide initial eligi-
bility assessments, technical assistance, and advice to one-stop staff on disability-related issues (Salzman
2006). One-stop career centers can offer services to those with less significant disabilities in need of
employment assistance who may not be eligible for VR services. They can also provide an additional
resource for VR eligibles not interested in VR services and for those not served because of VR’s “order
of selection” rule. VR clients can also benefit from additional employment assistance resources (e.g., job
listings, labor market information, and workshops on interviewing skills) available through the one-stop
career centers.
VR is often viewed as the partner that does not fit well within the one-stop career centers (Barnow and
King 2003; D’Amico and Salzman 2004). VR programs must comply with the Rehabilitation Act
requirement that VR staff and funds be used only for VR eligibles and not non-VR clients. This require-
ment limits the involvement of VR staff in the one-stop centers (Drew, McGuire-Kuletz, and Alan 2001;
Timmons, Fesko, and Hall 2002). Also, WIA’s funding constraints and performance standards often
lead states to limit intensive and training services. People with disabilities often need training that ulti-
mately costs more and lasts longer than these limits allow. The WIA one-stop system model does not
provide the wide array of accommodations and other supports that people with disabilities often need
(Holcomb and Barnow 2004).
VR and TANF interactions. Some states and local TANF programs have established partnerships with VR
to help them address the needs of some hard-to-employ TANF clients. At first glance, VR seems to fit the
needs of hard-to-employ TANF parents. VR’s specialized expertise in serving people with disabilities and
its focus on helping clients move to employment and self-sufficiency closely align to TANF program needs.
The most common VR and TANF partnerships co-locate TANF and VR staff (often within the one-
stop center or outstationed on an itinerant basis at the TANF agency) to provide initial VR assessments
for eligibility, training on how to identify disability, and using TANF dollars to pay for VR comprehen-
sive assessment services or VR counselors who carry specialized caseloads of TANF recipients with
disabilities. VR funding and rule constraints, however, limit the ability of TANF agencies to pay for VR
staff and constrain a potentially effective strategy for serving at least some hard-to-employ parents with
certain types of disabilities. 
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Both TANF and WIA have had mixed success tapping into the VR system on behalf of hard-to-employ
clients. Conflicting philosophy and programmatic priorities often make coordination with VR difficult.
The basic TANF framework of time limits and required participation in activities, often combined with
a strong work-first focus, runs counter to the typical VR program environment with voluntary partici-
pation guided by client empowerment and informed choice. VR more traditionally serves clients with
a longer timeframe for rehabilitation and return to work. In addition, VR does not target and has less
experience serving a long-term poverty population. Hard-to-employ TANF recipients often face more
complex problems than VR typically handles, including multiple barriers and issues related to poverty.
While many VR clients have severe disabilities, they often have greater financial and family or support
resources and more significant work experience (Holcomb and Thompson 2002). 
Services Focused on Particular Barriers
Other federal and state programs that focus on particular personal challenges also can play a role in sup-
porting work among low-income parents. Some parents need mental health, substance abuse, and
domestic violence services. These services are financed through a complex array of federal block grants,
Medicaid, private insurance, state funds, and local funds. Community social-service nonprofit organi-
zations also provide some of these services. Access to services can vary tremendously depending on where
parents live, with stronger networks of services generally more available in urban than rural settings. 
Mental health services. While parents with mental health issues sometimes need counseling and other
services to stabilize their condition before work becomes viable, it can be difficult to connect with these
services. Mental health services encompass a complex and fragmented set of service and treatment
options delivered in various settings. Both public and private sources fund these services through the
primary medical system (physician offices, health clinics, emergency rooms, etc.) or through the “spe-
cialty mental health services” system. This specialty system includes residential and community-based
options. Appropriate treatment and service settings depend on the specific mental health condition and
the severity of the problem. The public mental health system largely focuses on low-income individuals
but is characterized as fragmented and underfunded. Medicaid plays an important role in paying for
mental health services for the low-income population, including services and prescription drugs.
Mental health services can be required for acute conditions or long-term chronic conditions. The most
intensive treatment settings include inpatient psychiatric hospitalization and residential programs for
individuals with serious mental illness.21 These settings include state-funded psychiatric hospitals, psy-
chiatric wings of general hospitals, or private residential treatment programs. The use of psychiatric
residential programs has declined over time in favor of treatment in community settings. For example,
the percent of state mental health agency expenditures on inpatient mental hospital treatment has fallen
over the past two decades from 63 to 28 percent, while the percent of expenditures on community
mental health has grown from 33 to 69 percent (NASMHPDRI 2006). Partial hospitalization or 
day-treatment programs offer intensive services while allowing the individual to continue to live in the
community. 
Outpatient treatment services are the most common form of intervention, encompassing a broad array
of specific treatment approaches for individuals or groups. Services can be provided by specialized mental
health professionals (e.g., psychologists, psychiatrists, psychiatric nurses, and psychiatric social workers)
in service settings devoted to mental health services or by general health practitioners that provide a range
of health services. Voluntary support networks such as self-help groups and community organizations
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providing supports that extend beyond formal treatment are also a part of the mental health system. In
addition to the primary medical system, individuals can receive services through private mental health
practices, public community-based mental health services centers, and social service organizations. 
Public mental health service centers or clinics provide mental health services mainly to low-income
populations, often using sliding-fee scales based on patients’ income. These are funded in part by the
Community Mental Health Services block grant to states (in fiscal year 2006 about $400 million from
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services), Medicaid, and state funds. Access to and avail-
ability of these services vary tremendously across states and communities.
An array of community social-service nonprofit organizations also provides mental health services, some-
times to specific populations, such as homeless individuals, ex-offenders, or at-risk youth. These organ-
izations are more likely to provide mental health counseling and less likely to have psychologists or
psychiatrists on staff. They may serve clients through contracts with public agencies, such as TANF
programs, as well as having an independent client base (Derr, Hill, and Pavetti 2000). 
There has been enormous critique of public mental health services in this country. While the Surgeon
General’s report on mental health concluded that “a range of treatments of documented efficacy exists for
most mental disorders”(HHS 1999), many barriers to accessing treatments still exist, especially for low-
income individuals. Insurance plans, including Medicaid, can limit the type or length of treatment avail-
able, especially under managed care options. In addition, limited public funding for mental health services
reduces access. Increased reliance on Medicaid funding in public health systems may be reducing options
for those not covered by Medicaid. Treatments that have proven effective are often unavailable in com-
munity-health settings owing to higher costs, lack of appropriate service providers, or other reasons. One
report suggests that public mental health systems are so underfunded relative to demand that they focus
on serving those “most in need” at the expense of preventative or stabilizing services (Bazelon Center
2001). In addition, the continued stigma of mental illness keeps many individuals from seeking help.
Substance abuse services. As noted earlier, some parents with employment barriers have substance abuse
issues. This can be one of the most difficult employment challenges; often parents do not want to admit
that they have a problem, and many do not seek help. Parents who enroll in TANF and have substance
abuse issues get identified more often than parents outside TANF. State TANF offices in turn usually
refer individuals to the local substance abuse service system to stabilize this problem. TANF may also
require that individuals in treatment participate in work activities.
Most professionals acknowledge that treatment of substance abuse takes time and is a very individual
process. Services to help individuals overcome abuse and dependence of alcohol or drugs vary by 
the intensity of individuals’ needs and where they are in the treatment process. Also, there is a high co-
occurrence of substance abuse and mental health problems, and efforts have been promoted to serve this
population (Pollack et al. 2002). The federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administra-
tion (SAMHSA) has identified as one of its highest priorities the improvement of treatment and services
for individuals with co-occurring mental and substance abuse disorders.
Alcohol and drug treatment services include assessment and diagnosis; medication management (includ-
ing brief office or clinic visits supervised by licensed physicians using FDA-approved medications, such
as methadone); detoxification (management of individuals while they withdraw from alcohol or drugs);
short-term outpatient addiction counseling provided by certified professionals; extended counseling
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and continuing care by certified professionals (including ongoing support services around maintaining
abstinence, family counseling, or obtaining other social services); partial hospitalization for those need-
ing intensive, structured, ongoing counseling and medical management; short- or long-term residential
services for those with even more intensive structured needs; and case management services (including
help in obtaining other social services).22 These services are provided in a variety of settings including
hospitals, public and private clinics, nonprofit social-service agencies, and public agencies. 
The need for these services also exceeds the supply, especially for low-income individuals. Estimates for
2002 indicate that 22 million Americans age 12 and older have a substance use disorder (9.4 percent of
the population), but only a small proportion obtains treatment. An estimated 3.5 million people age 12
or older (1.5 percent of the population) received some kind of care for a problem related to the use of
alcohol or illicit drugs in the 12 months before being interviewed in 2002. More than half of those in
treatment (2.0 million) received care at a self-help group (Office of Applied Studies 2003). The lack of
treatment capacity explains part of the gap (Legal Action Center 2002). 
Public sources (local, state, and federal government) pay for about two-thirds of substance abuse treat-
ment services. Of all public expenditures on substance abuse treatment in 2001, 50 percent came from
state and local government funds, not including Medicaid. Medicaid pays for an additional 25 percent
of publicly funded substance abuse treatment services, and Medicare and other federal sources pay for
the remainder (SAMHSA 2005). The variation in the organization of services across communities
reflects the high percentage of funding by state and local systems.
Domestic violence services. Services needed by women experiencing domestic violence vary from emer-
gency housing to legal services to therapy. Available services vary across communities. In the late 1990s,
an estimated 1,800 programs nationwide served women experiencing domestic violence, including
1,200 shelters (Burt, Zweig, Schlichter et al. 2000). In most communities, private nonprofit agencies
run these shelters and supportive services for victims of domestic violence with funding from private and
public sources, including local, state, and federal funds. 
Following the implementation of new national programs and funding in the 1990s, there has been a
growing movement toward coordinated community approaches (Burt, Zweig, Schlichter et al. 2000).
These approaches try to effectively combine the efforts of law enforcement, prosecution, the courts,
health care, and social service agencies. The services provided can include hotlines, shelters, support
groups, individual and group therapy, legal advocacy, social service referral and advocacy, transitional
housing, and other support services. 
In initial debates over welfare reform, some raised concerns that work requirements could put some
women at risk of abuse from their partners. In response, the federal government allowed states to imple-
ment a family violence option (FVO), which includes screening recipients for domestic violence,
providing referrals to services, and exempting them from program requirements if necessary. All but a
few states have adopted the option, although actual waivers granted under the option have been limited
(Tolman and Raphael 2000).
Barrier-Alleviation Services and TANF Interactions 
There are numerous challenges for TANF programs in interfacing with service systems that address
particular barriers. Although mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence services face their
own challenges in providing services, they share many common issues around the interface with TANF. 
HARD-TO-EMPLOY PARENTS 19
The first challenge for TANF programs in connecting recipients with these service systems is identify-
ing individuals who need these services. Unlike physical health problems, these barriers often will not
be self-reported by recipients to TANF workers. This could be because the recipient does not define
herself as having the problem or she does not want to reveal the problem due to stigma, fear of losing
her children, or personal safety. Parents with challenges who go to the TANF office are usually seeking
cash assistance, not help in dealing with specific barriers. While individuals who directly seek out men-
tal health, substance abuse, or domestic violence services often need screening and assessment services,
they have already identified themselves as having a problem.
Use of appropriate screening and assessment tools is one part of addressing this issue, and a number have
been developed and implemented in TANF settings (Thompson, Van Ness, and O’Brien 2001). How
screening occurs is also important. Screening and assessment that takes place in a service provider setting
(for example, a clinic, hospital, or shelter) usually has specifically trained personnel using appropriate
tools and experienced with the given population. Some TANF programs have moved to co-locating
counselors in TANF offices who are expert in dealing with one or more of these barriers to carry out
screening and assessment. Other programs have moved sensitive assessment around need for domestic
violence services outside the TANF eligibility process altogether to be completed by domestic violence
advocates (Burt, Zweig, and Schlichter 2000). 
Another challenge is how to connect recipients with identified needs to services in the community. Refer-
rals to resources outside the TANF program with minimum follow-up or guidance often fail. Unlike
programs such as TANF with a well-defined process for access, these service systems may have multiple
providers and entry points in a community. Without formal partnerships, it may not always be clear
where to refer TANF clients for services. The complexity of these systems can pose difficulties for recip-
ients trying to navigate them without guidance. In addition, limited resources and overburdened systems
mean it is often difficult to gain access to needed services. 
Lack of understanding about TANF client needs and TANF program rules, particularly around work
requirements, sanctions, and time limits, also exists. This can mean that even those TANF recipients
who find their way into these service systems can face conflicting requirements or systems that fail to
meet their needs within the parameters of TANF program rules. 
Given these difficulties, many TANF programs have moved toward more direct connections to service
systems for hard-to-employ recipients. These include co-location of counselors in TANF offices, fund-
ing of services through contracts with community organizations that allow more TANF oversight, devel-
opment of program models that are specifically for TANF recipients and are TANF-funded, and more
intensive case management and follow-up of recipients that are referred to services. 
One difficulty for service providers in partnering with TANF is the need to track client participation in
services. This may be even more important under new DRA requirements. Not only may this be a new
burden for service providers, it can bring up significant issues of confidentiality and how to communi-
cate information across partners while protecting these rights. 
Multiple barriers faced by many recipients present another challenge for these service systems. Some
TANF programs now recognize the need to address individuals’ multiple barriers and to find program
partners that can address multiple issues. For example, the coordinated approach in some communities
for those who have experienced domestic violence seeks to provide housing, counseling, legal, and some-
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times work services. Some providers of substance abuse services also offer housing and mental health
counseling services. However, for the most part, providers have a primary service focus. TANF programs
often must create programs to address these multiple barriers or create ways to coordinate across dif-
ferent service systems, including hiring intensive case managers to coordinate services for clients with
multiple barriers. 
Finding ways to combine efforts to address and alleviate barriers while preparing for work perhaps presents
the toughest challenge for TANF programs. Federal work requirement rules and time limits demand pro-
gram models that can combine services to address barriers with services that prepare individuals for work.
Traditionally, many providers of services around these barriers have not been explicitly involved in work
readiness, especially for women with children. This has been changing, and some examples of programs
that address barriers and work have emerged (for example, see Morgenstern and Blanchard 2006 on sub-
stance abuse). Nonetheless, program administrators in the Loprest and others (forthcoming) survey fre-
quently mentioned the difficulty of combining these services as one of their greatest challenges.
Disability Cash Benefits for Those with Severe Health Barriers
The broad safety net for individuals with barriers to employment acknowledges that some adults can-
not work because of a physical or mental disability and recognizes these individuals’ need for cash assis-
tance. Two major public programs potentially offer benefits to low-income parents unable to work due
to disability. The means-tested Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides benefits to low-
income adults, children, and elderly, and the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program
provides benefits to adults with disabilities and work histories in covered employment.23 Individuals can-
not receive both TANF and SSI benefits, but TANF often serves as a gateway to the SSI program for
low-income parents. 
Both SSI and SSDI require that an individual has a medically determined disability expected to last at
least 12 months or result in death, and the disability must prevent engagement in “substantial gainful
activity.”24 TANF recipients with disabilities more often apply for SSI than SSDI because they typically
have low incomes, limited assets, and limited work histories. However, low-income individuals can also
qualify for a small SSDI benefit if they have enough work history and a supplemental state-funded
benefit in addition to the federal SSI benefit. 
Low-income adults with health impairments have a strong incentive to apply because SSI benefit levels
considerably exceed TANF benefits. The SSI benefit guarantees an income of approximately 75 percent
of the poverty level for an individual, and some states supplement this minimum. In contrast, the median
TANF benefit in 2005 provided an income of about one-third of the federal poverty level for family of
three. When a parent qualifies for SSI, the children remain on TANF receiving a child-only grant worth
about two-thirds of the full TANF benefit. Wamhoff and Wiseman (2006) calculate that families could
on average have increased their income by 115 percent ($552 a month) in 2003 by transferring one adult
from TANF to SSI. States also have an incentive to enroll TANF beneficiaries with disabilities in these
programs because federal monies (through the Social Security Administration) cover most of the bene-
fit cost. Also, when these individuals leave the TANF caseload, states no longer face the challenge of
engaging these individuals in work-preparation services.
Qualification for cash disability benefits is difficult, and the application process is complex and lengthy.25
Applicants must provide documentation to establish impairment, and SSI also requires detailed infor-
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mation on income and assets. The burden of gathering this information and providing contacts falls
mostly on families. The assessment of disability status is complex and time intensive. The state Disabil-
ity Determination Service (DDS) reviews the information submitted to SSA and decides whether the
applicant meets the disability eligibility requirements. The initial DDS assessment takes about 100 days,
and about 37 percent of initial SSI applications are approved, although approval rates vary considerably
across states (National Academy of Sciences [NAS] 2005). 
About one-third of the claims denied initially by the DDSs are appealed. This process usually requires
the assistance of an attorney to help claimants assemble a complete case record. Legal fees for TANF
recipients applying for SSI may be paid by the TANF office, often through contracts with legal services
offices. Other low-income applicants may get help directly from the local legal services office. Applicants
who appeal wait an average of more than a year from the time they are denied until their case is decided,
with successful cases receiving benefits retroactive to the time of application. Judges approve 61 percent
of appealed claims (NAS 2005). A small share of cases denied at this level can go on to an additional
appeal. 
In 2006, SSA began implementing new procedures across the country to shorten the time between appli-
cation and final approval (including new medical-vocational experts to make more accurate and timely
decisions). It is too soon to know, however, how much the new procedures will shorten the wait. 
SSI and TANF interactions. Researchers do not have good national statistics on the share of TANF clients
likely to have disabilities severe enough to qualify for SSI. In part this comes from the difficulty of
estimating who could meet the complex SSI disability criteria. We do know, however, that there is sig-
nificant overlap between the TANF and SSI adult populations. Wamhoff and Wiseman (2006), using
administrative program data, estimated that 13 percent of all TANF/SSP cases in 2003 lived in house-
holds that included an adult SSI recipient. They also found that 13 percent of SSI awards to women age
18–64 (about 34,000) went to recipients “associated with TANF” (those who had federally funded
income based on need at the time of SSI application).26 Nadel, Wamhoff, and Wiseman (2004) esti-
mated that one in three adult women receiving SSI benefits in 2002 (about 250,000 women) had some
previous association with TANF.27
States and local offices vary in how they connect TANF recipients with disabilities to SSI. Some simply
refer candidates to the program and suggest that they apply. Other offices take a more activist approach
by helping clients fill out the applications and monitoring their progress through the process. Loprest
and others (forthcoming) report that an increasing number of TANF offices are taking a more active
approach to helping recipients apply for SSI, including contracting with local legal services offices to
help applicants through the process or hiring specialists to work in TANF offices, usually through per-
formance contracts. New York City, for example, uses this second approach and claims a 50 percent suc-
cess rate in gaining approvals for clients referred to SSI. Similarly, Maryland assigns likely SSI candidates
to its Disability Entitlement and Advocacy Program that pays contractors to pursue SSI awards.
Some TANF programmatic factors can complicate the connections between TANF and SSI. TANF
allows recipients to have higher levels of assets than the SSI program, limiting some individuals’ ability
to move from TANF to SSI even if they meet disability criteria.28 Also, some state TANF programs allow
eligibility for immigrants in the United States less than five years, but the SSI program prohibits eligi-
bility. In addition, Loprest and colleagues (forthcoming) suggest that the long and complex SSI appli-
cation process presents unique challenges to TANF recipients. Applicants typically are exempt from any
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work activity during the waiting process because work participation could disqualify them for disability
benefits. Those eventually denied benefits have lost time that could have been used for additional train-
ing or barrier stabilization. The DRA requires that SSI applicants be included in states’ work participa-
tion rate calculations, intensifying the need for quick resolution of SSI applications. 
Summary and Implications 
Many low-income parents with children have significant impairments that make it difficult to work.
Some of these parents turn to TANF for help, but many do not. The best TANF programs offer tem-
porary cash assistance to these parents, along with connections to services that alleviate barriers, and
eventually help in finding work. Other federal-state programs that focus on work either provide more
generic employment services (WIA) or specialized services for those with severe disabilities (VR). Pro-
grams that address particular barriers to employment, including mental health, substance abuse, and
domestic violence services, often do not connect these services to work, nor do they particularly focus on
the special needs of parents. Finally, SSI provides long-term cash assistance for adults with severe phys-
ical and mental health diagnoses. Parents not enrolled in TANF can seek help from these separate ser-
vice and safety-net programs, or, more likely, try to make it in the labor market without help. 
Given TANF’s focus on low-income parents and their children, it is natural to review the safety net for
hard-to-employ parents through the lens of this program. All TANF programs embrace the goal of mov-
ing parents to work as their primary mission, and they vary tremendously in their success at integrating
all the services required by hard-to-employ parents to move to employment. States’ philosophies and
approaches to the needs of hard-to-employ parents vary across the country. Some believe that hard-to-
employ parents fare best when required to work immediately like everyone else. Others exempt parents
with physical and health disabilities from work participation and time limits, expecting to continue some
cash assistance for some of these families indefinitely. Most states fall between these two extremes. 
It is difficult to understand fully the implications of these disparate approaches for hard-to-employ par-
ents on TANF. Information pieced together in this paper from states’ TANF program rules, program
outcome data, specialized surveys of state and local welfare offices, and outcome studies highlights some
of the challenges and the variability in outcomes. Common reliance on individuals to identify their own
employment barriers rather than professional assessments means that hard-to-employ parents can strug-
gle for years to find employment before getting the services they need. In many cases, these individuals
lose benefits as a result of sanctions or time limits. Exemption policies that exclude individuals with sig-
nificant mental or physical health issues from program requirements can mean that parents languish on
the TANF program without getting appropriate barrier-removal or work services. 
TANF may partner with other programs that offer services to help hard-to-employ parents find and
retain work. WIA employment services aim to help all low-income adults find work, and VR focuses on
helping adults with severe disabilities find appropriate jobs. While WIA typically limits the amount of
time an individual can spend in training supported through WIA funds, core employment services are
available to everyone for as long and as often as needed. VR programs tend to provide client-oriented
services without restrictions on the time spent in employment services. Limited funding means that WIA
training assistance and VR programs serve only a fraction of individuals that need services. TANF pro-
grams can and sometimes do transfer money to pay for these services, but TANF’s emphasis on work
and time limits can conflict with these programs’ strategies. TANF may also connect hard-to-employ
parents with local mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence service systems. These programs
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focus on these primary services, and TANF programs must add the work services component that will
comply with TANF rules. For parents with severe disabilities, TANF programs refer them to federal dis-
ability benefits. Some programs help parents through this long and complex application process.
Hard-to-employ parents outside TANF can access employment or barrier alleviation services directly,
and they can apply for disability benefits on their own. However, most of these programs do not under-
stand the particular challenges of parents trying to cope simultaneously with the care of their children,
mental or physical health issues or other barriers, and the pressure to find work. Also, numerous stud-
ies document the difficulty of applying for disability benefits without legal assistance. The prevalence of
multiple barriers among these parents points to the need for intensive case-management services that
tailor barrier stabilization and work services to particular individuals’ needs.
Parents disconnected from work and welfare represent the most extreme cases requiring work services.
The consequences of not being connected to TANF along with the lack of any other alternative system
that integrates critical services can be significant. Parents may struggle indefinitely with their physical
and mental health issues and never connect solidly with the labor market. We do not know how often
these families receive help through other public programs such as WIA, VR, or services that address spe-
cific barriers. The limits of these programs, however, suggest that individuals may have difficulty access-
ing services that combine barrier alleviation with employment services. State TANF programs
increasingly find that parents with substantial barriers need intensive case management services to help
them navigate the maze of potential services to address often multiple issues (Loprest et al. forthcoming).
Given the current structure of the safety net for hard-to-employ parents, low-income parents seldom
have access to intensive case management services outside TANF. 
This review leads to the clear conclusion that we fail to offer an integrated system of supports for hard-
to-employ parents. These parents probably fare best when they apply for welfare, but many fall through
the cracks in TANF programs. The review does not lead to simple answers. Instead, it leads to some
broad questions:
n How should we provide access to services for hard-to-employ parents? Must they apply for welfare to
get coordinated services? Should we expect TANF programs with fixed block grant funds to solve the
complex problems of all hard-to-employ parents? 
n How much should the public invest in services for hard-to-employ parents? Are we willing to spend
enough on mental health, substance abuse, and domestic violence so all who need services can receive
them?
n How can we better connect work with services aimed at barrier alleviation and stabilization? Do we
need more specialists who can bridge these services? Do we need more intensive case management
services?
n Should we expect paid work to be feasible for all those with serious physical and mental health prob-
lems? Or do we also need a better, more accessible disability benefit program that allows individuals
to combine some paid work with a guarantee of some cash income support?
We can only begin to answer these questions by initiating a conversation with the leaders representing
the different aspects of the safety net serving hard-to-employ adults. This will be challenging since each
operates with funding from a different federal agency. As we have shown, the federal departments of
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Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services as well as the Social Security Administration all play
a role in the current safety-net system. States must administer the broad variety of programs within the
funding and program constraints defined by these federal agencies. The structure naturally leads to silos
and a lack of coordination of services for the hard to employ. 
The reauthorization of welfare presents the right time to think more holistically about the safety net for
hard-to-employ parents. States are thinking about how they will meet tougher work participation
requirements without harming hard-to-employ families. Changes in program guidelines that facilitate
partnerships across TANF, employment services, and barrier alleviation service programs coupled with
sufficient funding for these services will be required. Improvements in access to disability benefits for
the subset of parents with severe disabilities that reduce the need for legal aid and speed up benefit deci-
sions would help.
Reform will require leadership at the federal level with strong support from the nation’s governors. It will
require thinking outside traditional program boundaries. Understanding effective system changes may
require experimentation with new delivery mechanisms in the states. It will also take time and money.
Finally, program reforms should increase access to services for all hard-to-employ parents regardless of
whether they choose to participate in welfare.
This review calls attention to the need for rethinking the system of supports for hard-to-employ parents.
A move to action will require innovative thinking about how a system could be designed that meets the
needs of all hard-to-employ parents. A blueprint for system reform will require consideration of current
funding levels compared with needs for services; the roles of federal, state, and local governments; and
analysis of state initiatives that show particular promise. Most important, it will require thinking about
how a system could be designed that responds to the needs of parents who want and need to work but
need help in achieving this goal. 
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1. Other state and local adult education programs and the community college system are also important to hard-to-employ
parents with literacy issues and education deficits. This paper, however, focuses primarily on those programs and systems
supported largely by federal funds. It also includes domestic violence services since they can be critical for supporting some
hard-to-employ parents.
2. Lurie (2006), for example, observed the TANF application process in local offices in four states. She concluded that the
application requirements in states with strong “work first” programs in her sample discouraged entry among hard-to-
employ families.
3. A major advantage of these surveys was they all used the same survey instrument and measures of barriers. This consis-
tency greatly facilitates comparison of results across studies.
4. Other location-based studies also find that TANF recipients with barriers are more likely to become disconnected than
TANF recipients without barriers. See Turner, Danziger, and Seefeldt (2006) and Moore, Wood, and Rangarajan (2006).
5. The Welfare Rules Database is available online at http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd. 
6. Some states with no general exemption for illness or disability do exempt for “good cause.” Also, some states indicate no
general exemption for illness or disability but categorize TANF recipients as disabled in the statistics they report to the
federal government. Finally, three states (Illinois, Minnesota, and Kansas) that do not allow exemptions for illness or dis-
ability specify that they assign activities appropriate to the health of the applicant (per the Welfare Rules Database). The
formal program rules only provide a general sense of differences across states and cannot capture individual caseworker
decisions or local variability in application of formal state rules.
7. The GAO sample was designed to be representative of all welfare offices, not all welfare recipients.
8. As discussed later, TANF reauthorization requires individuals in SSPs funded with state MOE dollars to be included in
states’ work participation calculations beginning in fiscal year 2007.
9. Massachusetts and Hawaii also classify less than 1 percent of their caseload as disabled.
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10. Partial sanctions usually lead to “child only” TANF cases because only the children receive benefits. (In some places with
short sanction periods such as New York City the case may never move to the child-only designation.) In 2005, over 
40 percent of the approximately 2 million families on TANF were child-only, and 44 percent of the child-only cases
included a sanctioned parent (HHS 2006).
11. Two states, California and Rhode Island, are listed in table 2 as having a 60-month time limit that applies only to the adult
in the unit. Benefits continue indefinitely for the children. 
12. From the Welfare Rules Database, 2005.
13. See the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities and the Center for Law and Social Policy (2007) for a thorough discussion
of the changes in federal TANF rules included in the DRA.
14. Parents caring for infants less than 12 months old or family members in their household with disabilities still are exempt
from the participation-rate calculation.
15. The Interim Final Rule says that any hours of barrier-removal activities or job search during a week use up one of the lim-
ited weeks of participation.
16. Unpublished data supplied by New York City staff, April 2007.
17. By law there must be one full-service one-stop center in each of 600 local workforce areas across the country. Some local
areas have satellite centers and informational centers in addition to one full-service center. 
18. Data from U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, 2006.
19. Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, Self-Sufficiency among Social Services Clients in Virginia, House Document
No. 33 (Richmond, VA, 2006).
20. Federal funds flow through the Department of Education. The number of individuals receiving services includes only those
with specific rehabilitation plans; other individual receive counseling and guidance. Direct services accounted for $1.7 bil-
lion of total expenditures, guidance accounted for $1.2 billion, and other expenditures such as administration and facility
costs accounted for the remainder. States must match 21 percent of the federal dollars (Wittenburg and Favreault 2003).
21. This section is based on chapter 2 of “Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General,” 1999.
22. This section is adapted from Legal Action Center (2002).
23. Adults who experience the onset of a disability on the job may also qualify for workers’ compensation (WC). Veterans
Administration (VA) benefits cover individuals with disabilities who have been honorably discharged from the military.
Private-sector employees may also be covered by private disability insurance (PDI) as an employment benefit. These sources
of disability income are less likely to apply to low-income parents because they require significant connection to the labor
market or military experience. 
24. The SSI program also provides benefits for low-income seniors (over age 65) regardless of disability status.
25. Wamhoff and Wiseman (2006) estimate that about half of SSI awards to TANF applicants were completed within one
year, one-quarter were only completed in the second year, and one-fifth took more than two years.
26. These authors point out that administrative data systems make it impossible to calculate directly the number of TANF
adults who transfer to SSI. In particular, SSA data systems cannot identify adults in states’ SSPs as TANF recipients.
27. Nadel and colleagues calculated this association using the SSA 10 percent Master Beneficiary File. In this study, a previ-
ous association with TANF could occur because they were receiving TANF at the time of the most recent SSI application,
at the time of a prior application, or at some point when the applicant was living with an SSI applicant or recipient. 
28. SSI allows recipients to have a maximum of $2,000 in financial assets. TANF has updated its asset test to allow low-income
families to accumulate more savings for emergencies. While states’ asset tests vary, median allowable financial assets were
$10,000 in 2005 (per the Welfare Rules Database).
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